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The Journalist, Folk Devil 
 
Paul Lashmar 
 
 
 
Moral panics and the media 
The media are central to Stanley Cohen’s conception of moral panic. In Folk Devils 
and Moral Panics he says of the moral panic that ‘its nature is presented in a stylised 
and stereotypical fashion by the mass media’. Cohen is quite clear about the centrality 
of the media to the moral panic and states that ‘much of this study will be devoted to 
understanding the role of the mass media in creating moral panics and folk devils’ 
(1972: 17). 
      Most subsequent debate, at least in the UK, has maintained this centrality of the 
media. In Policing the Crisis (1978), Stuart Hall and his co-authors see the media as 
being at the heart of creating a moral panic over ‘mugging’. And one of the authors of 
this work, Chas Critcher, who has in the early years of  twenty-first century attempted 
to place moral panic theory in a much tighter conceptual framework in order to 
maintain its relevance, again stressed the importance of media (2003, 2006). Critcher 
argues that ‘modern moral panics are unthinkable without the media, though medieval 
witch trials managed without them’ (2003: 131), and notes that this stress on the role 
of the media is one of the factors which differentiates British approaches to moral 
panics from US ones, such as the ‘attributional’ school of moral panic theory lead by 
Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda (2009), or the approach taken by the social 
constructionists. These, he argues, tend to treat the media as mere channels through 
which passes information about deviance or labels that others have assigned, with 
little recognition that the media themselves transform information and play a key role 
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in the ways in which individuals or groups are represented as deviant (Critcher 2003: 
pp. 28-29) 
       However, by contrast, the approach taken in Canada by Richard Ericson, Patricia 
Baranek and Janet Chan fully acknowledges that the media have a dynamic role to 
play in the creation and sustaining of moral panics and is therefore closer in this 
respect to that taken by Hall et al. and Cohen. Thus, for example, they argue that 
‘news organizations are active in constituting what are social problems and what 
should be done about them’ (1987: 70). And all are concerned, albeit in different 
ways, with how, precisely, the media do this. 
     Hall et al. argue that a key way in which the media direct the debate is by giving 
voice to the primary definers of moral panic; this primary definition then sets the limit 
for all subsequent discussions of the topic by framing the ‘problem’ in a particular 
way.  
As they put it: ‘This initial framework then provides criteria by which all subsequent 
contributions are labelled as “relevant” to the debate, or “irrelevant” – beside the 
point. Contributions which stray from this framework are exposed to the charge that 
they are “not addressing the problem”’ (1978: 59). In short, Hall et al. suggest that the 
media support and publicise the ‘dominant ideas’ of the powerful with whom they are 
in a hegemonic relationship while ignoring those without power and who may take a 
very different point of view. In this framework, the media exclude or even demonise 
anyone who threatens to upset the status quo. Furthermore, Hall et al. point out that 
the media can themselves act as primary definers and create stories and issues; they 
are not merely passive reporters of stories created elsewhere. 
       To count as a ‘classic’ moral panic the media’s reporting of the issue in question 
has to be in some way disproportionate. It also has to be motivated by moral concerns 
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and aimed at bringing about some form of change in the law. In this vision of things, 
the media are seen as moral entrepreneurs who, often in collusion with other moral 
entrepreneurs, put public pressure on politicians to act; bombarded with the message 
that Something Must be Done, politicians push through hasty and ill thought-out 
legislation. The Dangerous Dogs Act 1997 is often used by moral panic theorists as an 
example of this process at its worst. 
      Moral panic theory belongs to that body of sociological and criminological 
thought which, as John Muncie points out, is less concerned with asking behavioural 
questions such as: What causes an individual to commit a deviant act? than with 
posing ‘definitional and  structural questions – why does an act become defined as 
deviant? deviant to whom? deviant from what?’ (1987: 44). However, he also makes 
the point that the concept of moral panic is an elastic one and ‘lacks any precise 
theoretical grounding’.  This, he argues, is in part ‘due to its origins lying in a loosely 
defined labelling perspective rather than a fully blown theory of social structure’. 
Consequently it can, in his view, ‘harbour several diverse theoretical positions and 
thus opens itself to internal contradiction and criticism from all theoretical sides’ 
(ibid.: 45). And more recently, even a theorist as sympathetic to the moral panic 
concept as Critcher has argued that there is a danger that ‘moral panics distort our 
capacity for understanding, even when they appear to recognise a genuine problem’ 
(2003: 117). In recent times, these problems have included phenomena as diverse as  
As happy slapping, helicopter parents, single parents, file sharing, hoodies, boy 
racers, immigration, binge drinking, gender issues, drug abuse, and paedophilia.  
 
The folk devils fight back 
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As a long-time journalism practitioner, as well as an academic, the question which 
most interests me about moral panics is: What does the moral panic concept bring to 
explaining the way in which the news media work? 
 
As noted above, the moral panic concept has been a much-used tool for identifying 
and analysing particular social phenomena. That it is still debated after forty years 
demonstrates its potential productivity and usefulness. However, it is by no means an 
all-purpose explanatory tool, and its value as a concept has been frequently 
challenged, with some critics have even suggesting that it is anachronistic and is 
largely redundant. For example, Angela McRobbie and Sarah Thornton suggested in 
1995  that circumstances had changed since the concept had emerged in the 1970s:  
‘The delicate balance of relations which moral panic sociologists saw existing 
between media, agents of social control, folk devils and moral guardians, has given 
way to a much more complicated and fragmented set of connections. Each of the 
categories described be moral panic theorists has undergone a fissure in the 
intervening years.’ (1995: 567) In particular, they suggested that the rise of radical 
pressure groups of one kind or another have reduced the influence of the traditional 
moral guardians on the mainstream media and thence on politicians,  and that 
commercial media interests have used the discourse of moral panic simply to attract 
youthful consumers, thereby devaluing its explanatory potential. 
       Similarly Critcher (2006) has observed that Mary de Young’s  (2004) analysis of 
the 1980s day care panic in the US produced similar reservations. In the United States 
during the early 1980s, hundreds of day care providers were accused of sexually 
abusing their young charges in ‘satanic’ rituals that included blood drinking, 
cannibalism, and human sacrifice. These allegations of ‘ritual’ abuse of children then 
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spread quickly outwards to Canada, Europe and Australasia, in spite of rigorous  
international investigations which found no evidence to corroborate the allegations 
and warned that a moral panic was exposing day care providers and other social 
workers to unnecessary public attention and attracting quite unjustified opprobrium.    
 
But whilst de Young used the notion of moral panic to conceptualise the ‘ritual’ abuse 
scare she also felt that the original concept needed amending and updating. In 
particular, she argued that it needed to be recognized that ‘each of Cohen’s stages is 
contestable. All the way from the initial definition and labelling through to measures 
resorted to, opposition may prove effective’ (Critcher 2006: pp.252-253)  In Cohen’s 
vision, folk devils tend to be passive victims. De Young’s analysis demonstrated that 
folk devils have developed the capacity to fight back. Thus she details how the day 
care providers who were cast as folk devils by what de Young calls ‘the child savers’ 
organised and used publicity to counter their persecution.  
 
A deflating phrase 
While academics continue to debate the value of the moral panic concept, the term 
has slipped into the public lexicon and now enjoys a considerable popularity in public 
discourse. In this respect, de Young argues that Cohen’s concept has been ‘facilely 
appropriated by media pundits, social commentators, and the public at large, and its 
casual use has divested it of much of its sociological relevance. And that is really a 
shame. It is a robust term, and the theory that surrounds and supports it, although a tad 
faded and frayed, still has a great deal of explanatory and analytical power’ (2004: 4). 
           Two groups particularly predisposed to using the phrase ‘moral panic’ are 
journalists and media students. A search of Nexis reveals a gradual increase in the use 
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of phrase in UK National newspapers from the late 1990s onwards in major news 
publications, though the prime users are commentators not news journalists. I can 
only offer a subjective view of the frequency of its use by students but I have 
encountered it frequently in both dissertations and essays. Neither of these two groups 
usually attempts to reference the evolving moral panic framework that gives 
legitimacy to the use of the phrase. This can be troubling with student academic work, 
but what is more surprising is that certain academics also use the phrase in published 
work without reference to any theoretical framework. (Do you want to give 
examples? - no). In short, the phrase ‘moral panic’ has all too often become a form of 
coded shorthand to criticize the media as well, on occasion, other primary definers. 
The question then arises: is this intellectual laziness, or the actions of individuals with 
a political or ideological agenda?  In many cases in which someone labels a particular 
episode a moral panic I feel compelled to ask: Does the writer have a particular 
ideological position on the subject of the story in question?  In this respect, it’s worth 
noting that there has also developed a certain resistance to the concept outside 
academia. So, for example, on 21 December 1993, in the aftermath of the murder of 
two-year- old James Bulger, an editorial in the Independent on Sunday editorial 
(hardly a paper associated with the creation of moral panics), argued that ‘moral panic 
is one of those deflating phrases used by sociologists and other allegedly impartial 
students of human behaviour to condescend to excitements amongst the general 
populace’. Similarly, a blog on the Spectator website which mentioned moral panics 
elicited the response: ‘What is the term “moral panic” doing in The Spectator? There 
are no “moral panics”. As objective social phenomena they do not exist; they are just 
a self-regarding phantasm of the left-liberal imagination’.1 
                                                 
1
 http://images.spectator.co.uk/alexmassie/3691056/the-pleasures-of-moral-panic.thtml 
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        Such criticisms suggests that the term also serves a more pernicious purpose, 
namely to create the impression that certain people take a detached, rational, 
analytical approach to political and social problems, as opposed those who exhibit a  
merely reflexive, knee-jerk response to challenges to received opinions and indeed to 
anyone who thinks differently from them. In that sense the term is more than just a 
conceit. It is also profoundly anti-intellectual because it attempts to stifle reasoned 
debate by portraying contrary points of view as simply subjective and irrational, if not 
indeed infantile and worthy of nothing but contempt. As such it represents not merely 
a serious misuse of language but a debasement of its purpose as a means of 
conducting reasoned argument. 
  
The missing voice 
If the concept of moral panic is to be of any theoretical and explanatory value, it must 
be possible to define a moral panic as a journalistic reaction to an episode or event 
which is demonstrably and empirically different from the reporting of an episode or 
event which is not defined as a moral panic. However, in the huge amount of 
literature on moral panics, I can find no substantive research which has taken into 
consideration the journalism practitioner’s experience, and few practitioners are ever  
quoted. I find it remarkable that there appears to be no published communication 
between the theorists of moral panic and the very people who are generally accused of 
being the perpetrators of disproportionate reporting. I would argue that the moral 
panic concept is significantly flawed by the failure to take into consideration the 
practitioner’s experience, and the processes of journalism more generally.  
    As a practitioner, I believe that moral panic theory would greatly benefit if the 
following questions were asked: 
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 How do media practitioners think about stories identified as moral panics?  
 Do journalists/editors write/publish a story with the intention of launching a 
moral panic?  
 What work has been done to demonstrate that moral panics attributed to the 
media as something negative are different from campaigning journalism that 
tends to be regarded in a positive light?  
 Does calling an episode a moral panic simply reflect the subjective or 
ideological position of the writer vis-à-vis a particular story or group of related 
stories? 
       Jock Young once argued, admittedly a long time ago, that it is possible for the 
media ‘rapidly to engineer a moral panic about a certain type of deviancy. Indeed, 
because of the phenomenon of overexposure – the glut of information over a short 
space on a topic so that it becomes uninteresting – there is institutionalised into the 
media the need to create moral panics and issues which will seize the imagination of 
the public’ (1974: 243). But my personal experience as a practitioner is that 
journalists start with stories, not with the desire to ignite moral panics. When 
considering the role of the journalist in the creation of a moral panic it is important to 
note that the identification of moral panics is almost invariably an ex post facto 
exercise. Of course, it is true that prior to publication or broadcast, the journalist can 
sometimes and to some degree judge whether a story is going to create a major 
reaction. But they rarely know the exact trajectory of any story, and generally have no 
idea whether the story will later be categorised as a moral panic, not least because the 
story has to go through several stages before it accrues that definition. 
      It would of course be fair to say that bias or exaggeration in the reporting and 
editing processes can result in news stories that can then be characterised as a moral 
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panic. Nor would I dispute the fact that there are newspapers whose reporting 
standards would lead to their stories more frequently being designated a moral panic 
compared to stories in certain other papers. But on the available evidence it is 
extremely hard to prove in specific cases that a moral panic is the intended outcome 
of a story, as opposed to simply a by-product of its publication.  
        The longstanding lack of detailed attention to journalism practice in the 
considerable literature on moral panic remains puzzling. The very title of The 
Manufacture of News (Cohen and Young 1973, 1981) suggests an account of the news 
production process, but, rather than studies of newsroom practice, what both editions 
of the book deliver, and very effectively too, are detailed critiques of numerous 
examples of biased and partisan reporting. As in Cohen (1972) and Hall et al. (1978) 
what we really have here are what were then new and radical ways of interpreting the 
social role of the media, and in particular their role in helping to maintain hegemony. 
This is particularly true in the case of Hall et al. Admittedly in their case this was 
nuanced, and they were careful to point out that ‘since the media are institutionally 
distinct from the other agencies of the state, they do not automatically take their lead 
from the state. Indeed, oppositions can and frequently do arise between these 
institutions within the complex power in society’ (65). But whilst recognising that the 
news media were not simply a department of state, and whilst providing various 
caveats to this effect, Hall et al. clearly saw the news media as, ultimately, means for 
maintaining the status quo. And this view, I would contend, has lingered on in certain 
academic approaches to the media, and to journalism in particular, in which there is 
more than a whiff of nostalgia for the Gramscian turn in media and cultural theory in 
the 1970s. While these are never clearly articulated there are frequent hints that the 
media join forces with each other and with the state in a conspiracy to deliver moral 
10 
 
panics. But whilst this may indeed be is true in certain cases it always needs to be 
proved and not merely implied or asserted. 
 
Exponents of the moral panic concept do not seem to take into account the 
fundamentals of newsroom practice at the micro level, and the production of the news 
is seen very much as a top-down editorial process. And yet the individual reporter can 
have a considerable influence on how a story is selected, reported and presented. 
Good journalism and good journalists catch the public zeitgeist often before the public 
have even articulated a concern. Part of the remit is to get stories first and hope that 
they will touch the public nerve. The journalist rarely knows how great a response a 
story will trigger (although it must be admitted that on occasion it can be fairly safely 
predicted). Every journalist will tell of their great scoop that fizzled out as a sudden 
and more important story dominated the day’s news. This element is completely 
ignored by the discussion of journalism’s role in moral panics, perhaps because it 
removes the ‘conspiracy’ element of the concept that emphasizes that the media 
manipulates the public. Manipulation requires malice aforethought, and time is rarely 
available in most news organizations for such conspiracy, nor is it thought desirable.  
 
Changes in the media  
I was a UK news journalist at the time that Policing the Crisis was written, and saw a 
reality which was much more diverse, complex and counterbalancing than Hall et al. 
would seem to allow. At the same time, however, I also saw the influence of the state 
on key parts of the media, from the BBC to national newspapers. In particular I was 
one of those who revealed the existence of the Foreign Office’s Information Research 
Department, a large, covert Cold War propaganda organisation that was closely 
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aligned with the intelligence services and had an enormous impact on media output 
not just in the UK but all over the globe. (Lashmar and Oliver 1998), and who also 
revealed that MI5 had secretly blacklisted many people applying for jobs in the BBC, 
frequently on the basis of their political views, and on ‘intelligence’ which was often 
naïve or inaccurate  (Leigh and Lashmar 1985). 
       However, the relationship between the UK media and the state has changed since 
the 1970s. In particular, many journalists have broken away from the state pressures 
on the news media brought about by the Cold War.  Intelligence academics Richard 
Aldrich (2002) and Christopher Moran (2011) have both documented the increasing 
willingness of journalists in the mainstream media to challenge the state even on the 
previously sacrosanct grounds of ‘national security’.  Additionally, by the late 1970s 
well-funded news organisations were prepared to support a healthy corps of 
investigative journalists pursuing stories that were genuinely in the public interest. 
       On the other hand, and far less positively and more critically, other changes, such 
as falling newspaper circulations, the rise of the Internet and the profusion of 
broadcast channels have made competition far more fierce than it ever used to be. The 
origins of these changes are both political and economic, in that it was the policies of 
‘de-regulation’ and ‘liberalisation’ pursued first by the Thatcher government and then 
equally enthusiastically by ‘New Labour’ which created the situation in which market 
forces were let rip across the media. In terms of broadcasting, this made competition 
for audiences far more fierce than it had ever been before, and threatened to make it 
much more like the national press in this respect. In both cases, the consequence was 
a significant increase in the amount what has been termed ‘market-driven’ or 
‘dumbed-down’ journalism or as Nick Davies puts it the “mass production of 
ignorance” (Davies 2008: 108). However, it also needs to be stressed that the picture 
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is not entirely bleak, and that certain news organisations – new and old – are still 
delivering high quality output and are prepared to undertake and fund investigative 
journalism which is genuinely in the public interest. 
        In his recent writing, Chas Critcher has attempted to come to grips with all of 
these changes in the news production process, in particular arguing against the over-
simplification contained in the very concept of the mass media and warning of the 
danger of generalizing about the media as a monolithic whole. As he quite rightly puts 
it: ‘It is important not to elide distinctions between different types of institutions 
(broadcasting and the press); newspapers (up-market, mid-market and down-market); 
constituencies (local and national); and genre (hard, news and background 
exploration)’ (2003: pp.131-132).  But even Critcher does not investigate the 
experience of the news practitioner and the actual processes by which news is 
originated.  
       In the absence of any academic engagement with practitioners, factors that 
practitioners would consider key to any understanding of the news production process 
are thus still absent from theoretical discussions of the role played by the media in the 
moral panic process.  
 
Facts versus opinion 
When analysing media coverage, theorists rarely distinguish between the role of the 
reporter and the role of the commentator/columnist/pundit, and yet the relationship 
between the two is very important for understanding the trajectory of a story. While 
reporters tend to be involved from stage one of the story, columnists tend to become 
involved only when the story has achieved some level of traction with the audience 
and wider public, although it does have to be admitted that this is not true in all cases 
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and that the increasing pace of news delivery of news has reduced the time between 
something being a news story and then the subject of comment.   
 
         On certain occasions commentators appear on the scene quickly, as in the James 
Bulger case – another story to have taken on the dimensions of a classic moral panic. 
The James Bulger murder story broke on 13 February 1993, and three days later there 
was an opinion-based piece by Melanie Phillips and Martin Kettle in the Guardian, 
headed ‘The Murder of Innocence’ and arguing that ‘the case of James Bulger 
exposes once again our society's growing indifference and our own increasing 
isolation. He trusted a stranger and now he is dead’.  The murder of Jamie Bulger has 
become iconic in the moral panics canon as a story turning, from a legitimate issue 
about children falling through every safety net which should have stopped them from 
becoming killers, into a moral panic about (a) ‘video nasties’; and (b) evil children. 
(Thompson 1998) (Barker and Petley 1997) and (Petley 2011: 87-114). The 
reporter/commentator, news/views contamination issue used to be unique to 
newspapers but it is has even spread into public service broadcasting where specialist 
reporters comment via blogs. Everybody, it seems, has an opinion, and not least when 
using the internet. 
The audience 
Thinking about moral panic in the way in which I am suggesting also leads onto a 
broader and yet again under-researched and under-theorised area – namely the 
relationship between journalists and their audiences. Journalists are keenly aware of 
their audiences because quite simply they depend for survival on fulfilling their 
requirements. When preparing their students for life in the news media, journalism 
academics teach them to be always aware of their audience. ‘Who is your audience?’ 
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we ask, ‘What is your audience’s age, background and interests?’, and ‘Is your news 
report geared to your audience?’ A news agenda aimed at the eighteen to twenty-five -
year-old age group may have to be very different from a report aimed at a middle-
aged audience. And yet the impact of this approach to news-making is still an under-
researched area. 
       When one looks at the Express or Mail, for example, one can see just how 
effectively they select material that will appeal to their audience. So when these 
newspapers run attacks on immigration, the EU, human rights, ‘benefit scroungers’ 
and so on, they are very carefully targeting their audience. Herein lies the $64 million 
question: at which point is the journalist ceasing to inform their audience (which is 
journalism is supposed raison d’etre) and is instead merely confirming and reinforcing 
their prejudices, either in order to conform to the paper’s ideological line or to deliver 
a story which the journalist knows will help sell the paper to its target readership?   
        Journalists tend to defend their profession by stating they have a duty to inform 
the population by delivering the truth. Yet practising spin and bias and delivering 
stories which may be only partly true (or indeed wholly untrue) merely in order to 
appeal to your audience is simply not journalism. Journalist, Richard Peppiatt, said in 
his evidence to the Leveson inquiry about his former employment at the Daily Star: 
“The truth (and by this I mean a moral,as opposed to legalistic truth) is treated with 
such flippancy, and their motivations so capitalistic as opposed to journalistic, as to be 
a prime example of the gross irresponsibility that has engulfed this country’s tabloid 
press, and for which I am ashamed to have been part.” (Peppiatt, 2011, pg 5) 
As gatekeepers, journalists make decisions about story selection and impose agency at 
every turn. It is of course easy to decry the Daily Star or Mail for these practices, but 
to a greater or lesser degree all journalists practise these techniques. For example, the 
15 
 
Guardian is very well aware of the interests of its readers. Are its stories selected in 
order to confirm their biases? How ready are the Guardian, Times or Telegraph to run 
stories that may conflict with their audience’s beliefs and values, even if these stories 
are true?  This area is under-researched and under-theorised by academics but is also 
ignored by practitioners, most of whom who will simply argue that journalism is an 
instinctive process, thus avoiding difficult issues such as confirmatory bias and 
editorial power, not to mention the nature of truth.  
 
          The second point about audiences is that, once established, they rarely exercise 
their power in any orchestrated way. Every journalist is only too conscious that if the 
audience does not buy the newspaper its future is in peril. The audience thus has the 
ultimate sanction. Only once have I seen an audience exert real, if still limited, 
collective pressure on a newspaper. This was when, on 19 April 1989, four days after 
the Hillsborough football disaster in Sheffield in which 96 people lost their lives, the 
Sun used ‘The Truth’ as its front page headline, followed by three sub-headlines: 
‘Some fans picked pockets of victims, ‘Some fans urinated on the brave cops’ and 
‘Some fans beat up PC giving kiss of life’, all thus alleging truly appalling behaviour 
by Liverpool FC fans. There was public outrage In Liverpool over what was seen as 
an outrageous smear and the newspaper was boycotted by most newsagents in the 
city. Many readers cancelled orders and refused to buy from shops that stocked it. The 
Hillsborough Justice Campaign also organised a less successful national boycott that 
nevertheless did have an impact on the paper's sales. The question still remains as to 
who the primary definers were of the initial Hillsborough coverage. Did police brief 
the press to distract attention from their culpability for what happened? (Scraton, 
Jemphrye and Coleman 1995)   
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        Too often accounts of moral panic ignore the audience, and when they do 
acknowledge them they appear to regard them as a lumped proletariat with more than 
a whiff of the old Marxist approach here, with the audience conceptualised as 
monolithic, easily influenced, and sheep-like. However, there is considerable 
evidence outside the domain of moral panic theorising that audiences are plural, 
active, and have varying levels of trust and belief in the various different media which 
they use. In the present context it is particularly worth noting that there is evidence 
that newspaper readers are well aware of the differences in the trustworthiness of 
different types of newspapers.  For example, an Edelmann survey published in 
January 2012 showed that of the public sampled:  68 per cent of UK readers distrust 
tabloids and 47 per cent trust broadsheets 
 
 
 
(Curtis, 2012) 
Barnett analysed YouGov data in 2008 that showed that slightly more than six in 10 
said that they trusted BBC news journalists a great deal or a fair amount. A little more 
than half gave the same response for Channel 4 and ITV journalists. At the other end 
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of the scale came the print journalists, with fewer than one in six prepared to trust red-
top journalists, and only slightly more for the mid-market titles. (Barnett, 2008) 
 
 
        For most of my career, journalists and editors have been acutely aware that the 
media outlet for which they work has a degree of cultural capital, in this case a 
reputation accumulated over the years built based on the quality of the journalism 
which it produces. Reporting which can be shown to be inaccurate or disproportionate 
lowers the cultural capital of the outlet in which it is found, and this can have serious 
consequences for the upmarket press in particular.  It could be argued that this is not 
true of more downmarket publications, but it should be noted that Rupert Murdoch 
closed the News of the World precisely because the revelation of its reckless 
journalistic methods expenditure not only caused readers and advertisers to desert it 
but threatened to put at risk both the cultural and financial value of the entirety of 
News Corp. 
 
Disproportionality 
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As we have seen, there are various models of moral panic, but common to all of them 
is ‘disproportionality’, the idea that public concern about something is not 
proportionate to its actual harmfulness. As Cohen puts it: ‘The very usage of the term 
moral panic … implies that societal reaction is disproportionate to the actual 
seriousness (risk, damage, threat) of the event. The reaction is always more severe 
(hence exaggerated, irrational, unjustified) than the condition (event, threat, 
behaviour, risk) warrants’.  However, he also recognises that critics have had 
difficulties with the notion of disproportionality, in particular asking:  
Why is this just assumed? And on what grounds is the sociologist’s view always 
correct, rational and justified? Even in these limited terms, the assumption of 
disproportionality is problematic. How can the exact gravity of the reaction and 
the condition be assessed and compared with each other? Are we talking about 
intensity, duration, extensiveness? Moreover, the argument goes, we have 
neither the quantative, objective criteria to claim that R (the reaction) is 
‘disproportionate’ to A (the action) nor the universal moral criteria to judge that 
T is an ‘inappropriate’ response to the moral gravity of A. (2002: xxviii)  
In Cohen’s view, however, ‘this objection makes sense if there is nothing beyond a 
compendium of individual moral judgements. Only with prior commitment to 
‘external’ goals such as social justice, human rights or equality can we evaluate any 
one moral panic or judge it as more specious than another’ (ibid.). And, as he also 
notes, it is possible in certain cases to adduce empirical evidence in order to 
demonstrate that a panic is disproportionate to the danger posed by the cause of the 
panic. An example here would be having recourse to actual immigration figures in 
order to dispute the claim that the country is being ‘flooded’ by immigrants. 
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       However, the question remains: how do journalists judge proportionality? This 
has not been asked. No one would of course disagree that media reporting is 
sometimes exaggerated or disproportionate. Some media moral positions are so 
contrived and attention-seeking that it has become common among certain comedians 
to satirise the media, and the experts and politicians on whom they draw, for their 
moral attitudinising, and to accuse certain papers of whipping up moral panics in 
order to increase their sale. And an excellent example of just how easy it is to whip up 
is provided by Chris Morris in the episode of the series Brass Eye (Channel 4, 1997), 
in which he gets various assorted pundits and politicians to inveigh against the wholly 
fictional drug ‘Cake’. 
         But who, ultimately, is the judge of disproportionately? We all have had the 
experience of thinking that something is disproportionate but how do we remove our 
own subjectivity and measure it, particularly if empirical evidence is unavailable or 
ambiguous?  Again, as with the phrase ‘moral panic’ itself, can the word 
‘disproportionate’ be a code for something which we don’t like for ideological or 
other reasons? Indeed, even empirically demonstrated cases of moral panics are all 
too rare. As Critcher notes of the study by Williams and Dickinson (1993) of 
newspaper crime reporting: ‘[This] is an example of a comparatively rare effort in 
moral panic analysis: to trace how far media coverage, in this case readership of 
particular newspapers, has discernible effect on how audiences view their social 
experience’ (2006: 190).   
 
Iconic and signal moments  
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Another aspect of journalism practice that does not seem recognised by moral panic 
theorists are what I would describe as iconic and signal moments and how these 
interact with moral panics. 
         Cohen argues in Folk Devils and Moral Panics that the media, police, local 
authorities, courts and the public overreacted to what was really a limited case of anti-
social behaviour. He may well be right, and it could be an acute case of what moral 
panic theorists tend to call the ‘deviancy amplification spiral’. But this jars with the 
fact that whenever the emergence of modern youth culture in the UK is discussed in 
print or on television it is usually illustrated by photographs of Mods and Rockers in 
confrontation. What happened on those beaches between 1964 and 1966 was an 
iconic moment in the development not simply of youth culture but of British society. 
If, as Cohen suggests, the conflict was minimal and was blown out of all proportion 
by the media and the authorities, why does it remain so iconic in the collective 
memory? Are these images iconic only because they are the product of a moral panic? 
Or are these images iconic because they capture a signal moment in time?  These are 
obvious questions, but Cohen does not tackle them. 
       Journalists, on the other hand, are very aware of capturing the iconic or signal 
moment. They recognise that a particular event can represent to the public an 
important social or cultural moment. Therefore the fact that an event is a one-off, or 
part of a series of linked events which is happening for the first time, does not make 
media coverage of it automatically disproportionate or moral panic-inducing. It may 
be symbolic of an important new trend in society, and the journalist works with the 
first draft of history not knowing which way it is heading.  
Moral concern 
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The very phrase ‘moral panic’ is problematic, as Cohen himself admits, ‘because of 
its connotation with irrationality and being out of control (2002: xxvii). As de Young 
puts it: ‘The term “moral panic” has the most unfortunate tendency to conjure up 
images of folks frantically fending off more demons than hell can hold (2004: 1) 
 Nor has it helped that the phrase has passed into certain areas of journalistic 
discourse where its ‘loose and often ironic use has compounded the term’s original 
ambiguities.’(Critcher 2003, 132) ‘Panic’ is a colourful and exaggerated term used to 
make a point. But it needs to be noted that there are many media reports that create 
moral concern, and that the term ‘moral concern’ is quite different from and has none 
of the pithiness or rhetorical impact of ‘moral panic’.  
          The phrase ‘moral panic’ may be a very convenient form of rhetorical 
shorthand but it may have served its time unless it can be fitted into a more nuanced, 
and also more empirically informed, framework. Thus I suggest the stand-alone 
concept of moral panic needs to be replace by a continuum of moral concern, which 
allows for factors such as disproportionality and panic but also justified moral 
indignation and outrage. It must also recognise, however, that one person’s moral 
panic is another person’s real concern, and that much great campaigning journalism is 
motivated by moral concerns. But what is it that makes one example of campaigning 
journalism an invitation to moral panic, and another an exposé of a social evil?  Does 
our assessment depend simply on our political and ideological perspective? This was 
a  problem addressed, albeit in a different context by former senior journalist at The 
Times and now Head of Journalism at City University, George Brock, in his 2010 
inaugural lecture in which where he warned of the increased use of ‘synthetic’ moral 
indignation by certain media outlets. In his view, this is poor journalism because it 
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devalues the outlets’ moral capital and does not resonate with the public, thus 
jeopardising and undermining the very existence of the outlets in question 
 
Baby P:  a case of moral panic? 
As we have seen, the concept of moral panic is a very elastic one, and the term has 
often been used loosely and inconsistently. So, in an attempt to answer some of the 
points raised above, let us examine the case of Baby P as a possible moral panic.   
 
Baby P was a seventeen-month-old boy who died in Haringey, North London after 
suffering more than fifty injuries over an eight-month period, during which he was 
repeatedly seen by Haringey Children's Services and NHS health professionals. He 
was eventually killed by his mother’s boyfriend. Baby P's identity, Peter Connelly, 
was eventually, revealed when his killers were named after the expiry of a court 
anonymity order on 10 August 2009. 
        However, the story as reported in the media, and especially sections of the press, 
rapidly came to be more about the incompetence of social workers rather than the 
degeneracy of a society where a child can be so brutally treated. Moral panic theorists 
suggest that the social workers concerned (and, by extension, social workers in 
general) came to be represented as ‘folk devils’. It is has been suggested that that the 
Baby P case was a moral panic in which the media response to a dreadful event was 
nonetheless disproportionate and with the wrong emphasis. “Stan Cohen, sociologist 
and author of the classic study Folk Devils and Moral Panics, suggests that the Baby P 
story bears all the hallmarks of a classic moral panic. Not because it isn't shocking, 
but as the attention is fixed on social workers, it switches attention from moral issues 
to technical decisions about risk (who should have intervened at this stage rather than 
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that?) as a way of getting rid of our anxiety. (Karpf 2008)  It is worth noting here that 
idea that social workers are demonised during societal failures is not new and there is 
a considerable literature on this point. (Franklin and Parton, 1991)        
        Moral panic theorists suggest that the media focus of the Baby P case was 
directed on the wrong issues. It may be that the Mail, Express and Sun may have deep 
ideological dislike of social workers but does that make social workers the wrong 
target of media attention in this case? Or were they an integral part of the wider 
problem? In order to address some these issues I thought it would provide a different 
perspective to talk to practitioner, in light of the central theme of this chapter, who 
reported in depth on the Baby P story and was critical of the actions of social workers. 
I interviewed James Oliver, a former colleague and the BBC Panorama producer who 
made two award-winning programmes on Baby P.
2
 
        Why did the death of Peter Connelly become such a big story? Oliver responded:   
A small boy is dead. A small boy might have been murdered. The police are 
investigating whether the small boy was murdered by his mother, her boyfriend 
and a second man. This alone would almost certainly make the national press 
under normal circumstances. But it would not necessarily say much about our 
society other than there is cruelty and child abuse in it. The tabloids would 
cover it extensively, TV news less extensively, and it might be covered by a 
documentary on Channel 5. 
However, he added, the fact that the boy was on the local authority’s At Risk register 
made it a much bigger story, one that justified attention being focussed on the social 
workers in the case:  
                                                 
2
 Panorama BBC1 hat Happened to Baby P? Transmission date: 17/11/2008 and Baby P: The Whole Truth? 
Transmission date 04/05/2009 
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The story immediately has the potential to become much bigger. Why? - 
because immediately there are questions to answer. If a child who is on the At 
Risk register is murdered, then something has almost certainly gone wrong.  It 
doesn’t mean anyone could necessarily have done anything more to prevent it, 
or that the decisions made were wrong. But the net result was a dead child, 
where the state was involved in the role of that child’s protector. So this story 
now has legs.  
          But why, I asked, did this story become quite so well covered? Why does this 
dead child become so significant when, sadly, there are many other dead children out 
there? Why does this one become iconic, and not the others? ‘Because’, replied 
Oliver, ‘of another murdered child, Victoria Climbié’.  
       Victoria Climbié died in London in February 2000. She had been starved and 
tortured to death. At the trial of her murderers – her aunt and her boyfriend – and in 
the subsequent inquiry it was found that her death had been avoidable and that the 
local authorities, which included the London Borough of Haringey, should have 
protected her but had signally failed to do so. But the inquiry, headed by Lord 
Laming, did not confine itself to what had happened to Victoria, and made 108 
recommendations for the reform of child protection, many of which were incorporated 
into the Children Act 2004. Thus, as Oliver pointed out, when it was realised that 
Peter died while on the At Risk register, it immediately raised the even bigger 
question of how a child care system which had supposedly been reformed failed him 
so completely:  
When we started investigating Peter’s death and how the child protection 
system was working we were told by government, the NGO’s, the local 
authorities, that all was well. In effect that this was just the horrendous murder 
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of one child that had no implications for the system in place. But that was not 
true. The system was failing.  Not only did it emerge that there had been 
systemic failures in Peter’s case, but Haringey’s social services were failing. 
And not just Haringey, Birmingham, Doncaster, and others, and even in those 
which were not failing we spoke to social workers who had major fears about 
the way the system was working 
         What is interesting about this perspective from a news practitioner’s perspective 
(although it is important to note that it is that of a BBC producer, who is bound by 
much stricter editorial guidelines – particularly those concerning impartiality – than  
those governing the press) is that it very clearly illustrates why he felt the story to be 
so important, and also why he believed it vital to focus on the aspect of the story 
which concerned the social services, and social workers in particular. It should also be 
noted that never once does he mention the notion of moral panic. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The failure of theorists to engage with practitioners when seeking to understand the 
moral panic concept is surprising. That, in the forty-year-old canon of moral panic 
theorising , I cannot find any evidence of sustained interaction with news practitioners 
or any book or article which gives a news practitioner’s  perspective on the subject I 
find shocking. Academics associated with the deviance school have interviewed 
journalists for a range of texts (Cohen and Young 1973) (Chibnall 1977) (Schlesinger 
and Tumber, 1994). But there is no major work on moral panics per se that includes 
practitioners’ views or experience. Moral panic theorists are the first to cry conspiracy 
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and bias when voices they deem important are left out of media reports. So why not 
interview journalists on moral panics? 
      Given the centrality of the media to moral panic theory the practitioners’ view 
would seem to be well worth exploring. I would argue that experience on the news 
desk could reveal aspects of news production to which moral panic theorists seem 
oblivious. This would include observing that that news production can on occasions 
be a bottom-up rather than a top-down process, particularly when the reporter 
identifies a new zeitgeist-defining event. I would also suggest that those who make 
use of the moral panic concept need to develop a better understanding of the news-
making process in general. And finally I would like to re-iterate the idea of attempting 
to construct a continuum of moral concern, which would also involve devising an 
empirical framework within which to measure moral indignation, so that justified 
moral indignation can be distinguished from unjustified moral panic. 
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